ПРАКТИЧНЕ ЗАНЯТТЯ З АНГЛІЙСЬКОЇ МОВИ НА ТЕМУ «ПОШИРЕННЯ ЯДЕРНОЇ ЗБРОЇ У СВІТІ»

Reading comprehension. Understanding the main points T: Read the article "Why Iran should get the bomb" and say whether these statements are true (T) or false (F): 1)
The past several months have witnessed a heated debate over the best way for the United States and Iran to respond to Israel's nuclear activities. 2) A breakout capability might satisfy the domestic political needs of Iran's rulers by assuring hard liners that they can enjoy all the benefits of having a bomb (such as greater security) without the downsides (such as international isolation and condemnation). 3) Punishing a state through economic sanctions inexorably derails its nuclear program. 4) It is possible, then, that a verifiable commitment from Iran to stop short of a weapon could appease major Western powers. 5) Iran succeeded in building its weapons despite countless rounds of sanctions and UN Security Council resolutions. 6) Every time another country has managed to shoulder its way into the nuclear club, the other members have always changed tack and decided to live with it. 7) In 1981, Israel bombed Syria to prevent a challenge to its nuclear monopoly. 8) Israel's proven ability to strike potential nuclear rivals with impunity has inevitably made its enemies anxious to develop the means to prevent Israel from doing so again. 9) Experts believe that Japan could produce a nuclear weapon on short notice. 10) The crisis over Iran's nuclear program could end in two different ways.
Why Iran Should
Get the Bomb A The past several months have witnessed a heated debate over the best way for the United States and Israel to respond to Iran's nuclear activities. As the argument has raged, the United States has tightened its already robust sanctions regime against the Islamic Republic, and the European Union announced in January that it will begin an embargo on Iranian oil on July 1. Although the United States, the EU, and Iran have recently returned to the negotiating table, a palpable sense of crisis still looms. B It should not. Most U.S., European, and Israeli commentators and policymakers warn that a nuclear armed Iran would be the worst possible outcome of the current standoff. In fact, it would probably be the best possible result: the one most likely to restore stability to the Middle East. The crisis over Iran's nuclear program could end in three different ways. First, diplomacy coupled with serious sanctions could convince Iran to abandon its pursuit of a nuclear weapon. But this outcome is unlikely: the historical record indicates that a country bent on acquiring nuclear weapons can rarely be dissuaded from doing so. Punishing a state through economic sanctions does not inexorably derail its nuclear program. Take North Korea, which succeeded in building its weapons despite countless rounds of sanctions and UN Security Council resolutions. If Tehran determines that its security depends on possessing nuclear weapons, sanctions are unlikely to change its mind. In fact, adding still more sanctions now could make Iran feel even more vulnerable, giving it still more reason to seek the protection of the ultimate deterrent. C The second possible outcome is that Iran stops short of testing a nuclear weapon but develops a breakout capability, the capacity to build and test one quite quickly. Iran would not be the first country to acquire a sophisticated nuclear program without building an actual bomb. Japan, for instance, maintains a vast civilian nuclear infrastructure. Experts believe that it could produce a nuclear weapon on short notice. D Such a breakout capability might satisfy the domestic political needs of Iran's rulers by assuring hard liners that they can enjoy all the benefits of having a bomb (such as greater security) without the downsides (such as international isolation and condemnation). The problem is that a breakout capability might not work as intended. E The United States and its European allies are primarily concerned with weaponization, so they might accept a scenario in which Iran stops short of a nuclear weapon. Israel, however, has made it clear that it views a significant Iranian enrichment capacity alone as an unacceptable threat. F It is possible, then, that a verifiable commitment from Iran to stop short of a weapon could appease major Western powers but leave the Israelis unsatisfied. Israel would be less intimidated by a virtual nuclear weapon than it would be by an actual one and therefore would likely continue its risky efforts at subverting Iran's nuclear program through sabotage and assassination -which could lead Iran to conclude that a breakout capability is an insufficient deterrent, after all, and that only weaponization can provide it with the security it seeks. G The third possible outcome of the standoff is that Iran continues its current course and publicly goes nuclear by testing a weapon. U.S. and Israeli officials have declared that outcome unacceptable, arguing that a nuclear Iran is a uniquely terrifying prospect, even an existential threat. Such language is typical of major powers, which have historically gotten riled up whenever another country has begun to develop a nuclear weapon of its own. Yet so far, every time another country has managed to shoulder its way into the nuclear club, the other members have always changed tack and decided to live with it. In fact, by reducing imbalances in military power, new nuclear states generally produce more regional and international stability, not less. H Israel's regional nuclear monopoly, which has proved remarkably durable for the past four decades, has long fueled instability in the Middle East. In no other region of the world does a lone, unchecked nuclear state exist. It is Israel's nuclear arsenal, not Iran's desire for one, that has contributed most to the current crisis. Power, after all, begs to be balanced. What is surprising about the Israeli case is that it has taken so long for a potential balancer to emerge. I Of course, it is easy to understand why Israel wants to remain the sole nuclear power in the region and why it is willing to use force to secure that status. In 1981, Israel bombed Iraq to prevent a challenge to its nuclear monopoly. It did the same to Syria in 2007 and is now considering similar action against Iran. But the very acts that have allowed Israel to maintain its nuclear edge in the short term have prolonged an imbalance that is unsustainable in the long term. Israel's proven ability to strike potential nuclear rivals with impunity has inevitably made its enemies anxious to develop the means to prevent Israel from doing so again. In this way, the current tensions are best viewed not as the early stages of a relatively recent Iranian nuclear crisis but rather as the final stages of a decades long Middle East nuclear crisis that will end only when a balance of military power is restored.
Learning and practicing vocabulary
Definitions
T: Match these words (1 10) from the article "Why Iran should get the bomb" with their meanings (a j).
T: Find words and expressions in the article which fit these meanings. 1 disadvantage of something (paragraph D)
2 an official order to stop trade with another country (paragraph A) 3 too bad to be approved of, or allowed to continue (paragraph E) 4 not controlled or stopped (paragraph H) 5 inevitably (paragraph B) 6 decide not to do something (paragraph C) 7 seem likely to happen and cause worry (paragraph A) 8 the capacity to build and test a nuclear weapon quite quickly (paragraph D) 9 course of action (paragraph G) 10 yield the demands (paragraph F) Word partnerships T: Match these words to make adjective noun partnerships from the article.
Text completion T: Complete this text with the words and expressions
without using the article: a) a situation in which agreement in an argument does not seem possible b) able to be proved c) prevent a plan or process from succeeding d) something that makes someone less likely to do something e) happened in a strong or violent way f) strong disapproval of someone or something g) serious discussion of a subject in which many people take part h) strong and unlikely to break or fail i) persuaded someone not to do something j) freedom from punishment 
condemnation
The past several months have witnessed 1) ____ over the best way for the USA and Israel to respond to Iran's nuclear activities. As the argument 2) _____, the USA has tightened its already 3) ____ sanctions regime against the Islamic Republic, and the European Union announced in January that it will begin an 4) ______ on Iranian oil on July 1. Although the United States, the EU, and Iran have recently returned to the 5) ____, a palpable sense of crisis still 6) ____.
It should not. Most U.S., European, and Israeli commentators and policymakers warn that a nucleararmed Iran would be the worst possible outcome of the current 7) ____. In fact, it would probably be the best possible result: the one most likely to restore 8) ____ to the Middle East.
The crisis over Iran's nuclear program could end in three different ways. First, diplomacy coupled with serious 9) _____ could convince Iran to abandon its pursuit of a nuclear weapon. But this outcome is unlikely: the historical record indicates that a country bent on acquiring nuclear weapons can rarely be 10) ____ from doing so. Punishing a state through economic sanctions does not inexorably 11) ____ its nuclear program. In fact, adding still more sanctions now could make Iran feel even more vulnerable, giving it still more reason to seek the protection of the ultimate 12) ____.
The second possible outcome is that Iran 13) ____ of testing a nuclear weapon but develops a 14) ____ capability, the capacity to build and test one quite quickly.
Such a breakout capability might satisfy the domestic political needs of Iran's rulers by assuring hard-liners that they can enjoy all the benefits of having a bomb (such as greater security) without the downsides (such as international isolation and 15) _____ ). Israel, however, has made it clear that it views a significant Iranian enrichment capacity alone as an unacceptable threat. It is possible, then, that a verifiable commitment from Iran to stop short of a weapon could 16) ____ major Western powers but leave the Israelis unsatisfied.
The third possible outcome of the standoff is that Iran continues its current course and publicly goes nuclear by testing a weapon. U.S. and Israeli officials have declared that outcome unacceptable, arguing that a nuclear Iran is a uniquely terrifying prospect, even an existential 17) ___.
Israel's regional nuclear monopoly, which has proved remarkably durable for the past four decades, has long fueled instability in the Middle East. In no other region of the world does a lone, unchecked nuclear state exist. It is Israel's nuclear arsenal, not Iran's desire for one, that has contributed most to the current crisis. Power, after all, begs to be balanced.
Of course, it is easy to understand why Israel wants to remain the 18) ___ nuclear power in the region and why it is willing to use force to secure that status. Israel's proven ability to strike potential nuclear rivals with 19) ____ has inevitably made its enemies anxious to develop the means to prevent Israel from doing so again. In this way, the current tensions are best viewed not as the early stages of a relatively recent Iranian nuclear crisis but rather as the final stages of a decadeslong Middle East nuclear 20) ___ that will end only when a balance of military power is restored. 
